The paper explores factors that influence the design of financing contracts between venture capital investors and European venture capital funds. 122 Private Placement Memoranda and 46 Partnership Agreements are investigated in respect to the use of covenant restrictions and compensation schemes. The analysis focuses on the impact of two key factors: the reputation of VC-funds and changes in the overall demand for venture capital services.
Introduction
Long-term contracts that govern relationships between venture capital (VC) partnerships and investors determine all rights and obligations between the parties over the entire period of capital investment. A sophisticated contractual design may reduce principal-agent costs in the relation between investors and VC-fund-managers. Covenants that restrict the venture capitalists' scope of action and compensation terms are the key items that govern the principal agent relationship. Based on the information exchanged at an initial date the parties design a pareto-optimal long-term contract. 1 The initial design of the partnership agreement (PA) is important because renegotiations are often very difficult to achieve due to the large number of involved investors.
The VC-market i s characterized by large information asymmetries. 2 Partnership agreements are not made public and show a high degree of dispersion. We are interested in the factors that affect contract design. In particular, we examine the effects of the reputation and bargaining power of VC-funds on the design of partnership agreements. Furthermore, we compare our results to those of the US in order to understand differences and similarities across both markets.
In the United States, the VC-industry grew dramatically during the late 1970s and early 1980s. It is today a mature and well established investment alternative. 3 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1979 was the most important factor accounting for the strong increase in capital inflows from institutional investors, especially pension funds, into the VC-sector. 4 In contrast, the continental European VC-fund industry used to be a very small market segment until the mid 1990 th and often is still today believed to be underdeveloped as compared to the US market. Contract design may also be affected by bargaining power effects. Gompers and Lerner (1996) show that VC-funds in the US are able to reduce the number of restrictive covenants in years with high supply of venture capital and interpret this as a result of increased bargaining power by VC-funds. We do not find similar evidence for Europe. Instead, we find that VCfunds receive less base compensation and higher performance related compensation in years with strong capital inflows into the VC industry. We interpret this as an indication that fund managers may have been the victim of overconfidence.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II outlines the principal agent problems between investors and venture capitalists and the importance of contractual arrangements. The section also describes the contractual items used in this study. Section III derives testable hypothesis based on existing theoretical models. Section IV summarizes related empirical evidence for the US. Section V describes in detail our data sample and provides summary statistics. Section VI presents the empirical results of the descriptive and uni-/multivariate analysis for Europe. Section VII concludes and gives an outlook on future research. Barry (1994) characterizes the VC process as a multiple-agent relationship. Agency problems arise at the interaction between the venture capitalist and both the investors and the entrepreneurs. 8 The present study concentrates on the first step and analyses the relation between investors and venture capitalist. 8 See Barry (1994) , pp.12 f.
Contractual relations between VC limited partnerships and investors a. Conflicts of interest
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The literature on agency problems in VC markets covers mainly the relationship between VC-firm and portfolio-company. This is the typical principal-agent framework where the entrepreneur is the agent and the venture capitalist is the principal. Less analysed is the additional relationship between the outside investors and the VC-fund. Sahlmann (1990) describes both levels of asymmetric information in a VC limited partnership. He gives an overview of VC-funding and describes potential conflicts between venture capitalists and their investors. Sahlmann suggests the solution for that principal-agent problem in an appropriate design of partnership agreements. Barry (1994) summarises former studies of VC funding. Moreover, he analyses new directions of potential research. He suggests the progress in research of "the contracting technology that permits venture capitalists to manage their dual roles as agents with respect to their limited partners-investors and as principals with respect to entrepreneurs in their portfolio firms." 9 According to Barry, the same contractual mechanisms that are used to settle the relationships to their portfolio companies are often used to adjust investors' concerns. He points out how difficult it is to develop empirical evidence on VC.
Data on VC investments are always private. 10 Analysing the German VC market Zemke (1995) bases his studies about the solution of principal agent problems on empirical evidence developed from the data of 40 questionnaires. While he was doing a more general study he was even addressing contractual designs. Empirical papers by Gompers and Lerner (1996 und 2001 analyse the structure of partnership agreements including compensation terms and the use of covenants. They develop hypotheses about the relationship between certain economical aspects and both the compensation of venture capitalists and the existence of covenants. Their analyses refer exclusively to US VC partnerships. 11 The investment in VC-funds is associated with a high degree of information asymmetry.
Monitoring the prospects and, furthermore, understanding the business of each individual investment done by the fund is extraordinary difficult for single investors. The venture capitalist has many opportunities to behave opportunistic and to take advantage of the delegated power. These potential conflicts have to be addressed in the partnership agreements.
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Grossman and Hart (1993) suppose risk sharing between the principal and the agent as a general way of reducing agency problems. 13 In accordance to the findings developed in the literature of agency theory 14 Spremann (1988) and (1990) identifies three contractual ways of arranging compensation terms in order to reduce agency problems: First, the level of performance related compensation of the funds' manager gives incentives to increase the capital gains of the fund. The relative level of variable to fix compensation is decisive. The complete efficiency of this incentive scheme, however, is based on the assumption, that a changing effort level of the agent can only induce higher capital gains and no capital loss.
This assumption is not met in the case of VC investing. Second, the actions of the venture capitalist may be adjusted by compensating him for capital gains, but punishing him for capital loss. This effect can be achieved either by monetary or reputational gains and casualties. 15 Third, an obligation to compensate the capital loss with its own liquidity gives incentives to reduce opportunistic behaviour. However, this kind of contractual arrangement is not usual in the VC-industry.
Besides these monetary incentives, contractual investment principles in form of covenants may prevent the venture capitalist from engaging in actions that are against the investors' interest.
b. The VC partnership agreements
The principal-agent relationships between investors (principal) and VC fund (agent Rees (1985) . 15 In the case of venture capital the managing directors are tied to monetary loss of the fund, if they made a capital contribution to the fund (own partnership shares). Our empirical results, however, disclose no correlation between the existence of a capital contribution done by the managing directors and their reputation. Therefore a substitution of one incentive given by a high reputation for another incentive (capital contribution) cannot be claimed. See theoretical discussion also in Hart, O. /Holmström, B (1985), pp. 79 f.
i. Compensation terms
The VC-firm receives two kinds of compensation for managing the investments in each limited partnership: the fixed component is the "management fee", the performance related component is the "carried interest".
The management fee is, in general, expressed as a percentage on the committed capital and paid annually. Often the fee is tapered after the commitment period. This reflects the fact that less time has to be spent in managing activities, if the investments are mature and partly realized. Tapering the management fee is effected by either reducing the accounting basis on which the rate is applied -for example by replacing the committed capital by the real capital under management -or by reducing the percentage rate, which has to be paid for compensation. A tapered fee corresponds to the real purpose of the management fee to cover the costs of running and administering the fund.
The second source of compensation, the carried interest, entitles the venture capitalists to a certain share of the capital gains of the fund. 16 This incentive compensation corresponds to the first theoretical aspect of financial contracting mentioned by Spremann. The carried interest is only paid, if the investor has received back at least hundred per cent of his invested capital. Some partnerships contain a hurdle rate, which represents a preferred annually interest payment to the investor. The hurdle rate, however, is not a guaranteed interest payment to the investor. The existence of a hurdle rate reduces the VC-managers' value of his carry option.
Arrangements which obligate the managing directors to make a capital contribution to the fund increase the incentives to achieve high performance. While they invest their own capital in the vehicle the responsible managers also share a capital loss of the fund. This contractual obligation corresponds to Spremanns' second theoretical proposal of reducing agency problems.
ii. Covenants
Besides incentives that are provides by compensation terms, certain contractual restrictions regulate the actions of the managing directors. The covenants may prevent the funds' managers from opportunistic behaviour and from acting in a selfish way. The conceptual framework commonly used in incomplete contract literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or foreseeing future 16 
Hypothesis about the determinants of contractual design a. Reputation as a driver of contractual design
Raising funds is a function of the venture capitalists' ability to convince potential investors of their management quality. This means, only high performance venture capitalists are able to raise follow-on-funds and, while working trustworthy, to develop high reputation.
Tradelis (1997) developed a reputation model in which a firms' only asset is its name. This comes close to the situation in the VC business where a respected name is the basis of high reputation. Spremann (1988) discusses reputation in general as an incentive to continue high quality management and not to engage in opportunistic behaviour. Within the principal agent relationship reputation can be seen as a security given by the agent to the principal. The value of that security is developed, because misbehaviour or actions against the interests of the principal may reduce the agents' reputational capital. As a result, opportunities of future fund raisings would decline. 19 The potential opportunity of losing reputation may be seen as an extraordinary intangible contract between the investor and the venture capitalist. 20 This additional security given by high reputation may have effects on the compensation terms and the need for covenants.
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Leaving out important covenants that regulate the relation between investors and the venture capitalists means less specified obligations for future states. These incomplete contracts open opportunities of acting in an opportunistic way, because future contract renegotiations are unusual and mostly not possible. Inherent incentives given by the risk of loosing reputation may adjust those less specified contractual relations. The costly need to implement covenants may be reduced. On the contrary, young venture capitalists without reputational capital are confronted with an increased need to specify their future obligations.
They have no inherent incentives given by the existence of reputation which fill the gaps of incomplete contracts without the needed restrictions. According to that common theoretical approach we develop the hypothesis that fund managers with high reputation integrate fewer covenants that are costly to implement and to monitor.
Venture capitalists with high reputation will charge that additional security. Gompers and Lerner (1999) introduce two models which could explain the variation in compensation. 21 The signalling model predicts higher fixed fees for older and larger venture capital organizations that demand insurance. They charge that additional security given by a high reputation. They demand for higher fixed fees. Non-debut funds with established reputation, therefore, have relatively lower powered monetary incentive schemes than first time funds. Here, incentives are given by a potential loss of their reputation. On the contrary, the learning model predicts first time fund managers to work harder anyway to gain reputation. Highly incentive compensation is not necessary. This model predicts that young managers charge higher fixed fees in relation to performance related fees. Therefore, debut funds have less monetary incentives.
b. Bargaining power as a driver of contractual design
This hypothesis contends that the relative supply and demand situation in the VC-market determines the bargaining power of the managers in times of fund raising. Since the partnership agreements are usually not renegotiated, this is not a repeated bargaining environment. 22 The fund managers' bargaining power at an initial date affects the contractual design and, therefore, all future options. According to a certain supply/demand situation the equilibrium price adjustment takes place. This happens invisible through the insertion or deletion of covenants and visible through explicit monetary compensation. Less contractual 21 Complete description and derivation of the learning and signalling model in Gompers/Lerner (1999) 
Related literature -empirical evidence for the US
Gompers / Lerner (1999) and (1996) analyse the contractual relations between investors and US venture capital funds. They also examine the use of covenants and compensation terms as contractual arrangements to reduce agency problems. Gompers and Lerner (1999) find empirical evidence that reputation is an important factor determining compensation terms. In the US, fund managers with high reputation charge lower fixed fees. The sensitivity to performance is higher. These findings are consistent with the learning model. They found no significant effect of reputation on the use of covenants.
On the other hand, a relatively higher demand for VC-services leads to a declining number of included covenants. (29) , Switzerland (5), Netherlands (5), Norway (3), France (13), Sweden (4), Italy (2), Ireland (3), Belgium (4), Iceland (1), Spain (1), Luxemburg (1), Denmark (2), Finland (1), Pan-European (5). The representativeness of the sample is measured as the ratio of the aggregated funds volume of the sample partnerships (total or each regional segment) and the total volume of the VC-market (total or the regional segment). For calculations in the last three columns, the data of every country are used as completely separate datasets. We collected the relevant data on compensation terms (Management Fee, Carried Interest, Hurdle Rate) from the PPMs. These offering memoranda are used as marketing instruments and describe all details on the VC-firm, the funds' manager, the investment strategy and the investment conditions. Using the PAs we generated a separate dataset for the analysis of the included covenants and capital contributions of the funds' manager. The PAs contain all relevant data, including data about the rights and obligations of the managing directors and the limited partners. For every PA the corresponding PPM was available. So we could verify all compensation data with those we have collected from the PPMs. All currencies were converted to Euro.
Empirical results for Europe
In this section, we examine the factors that affect contract design. We use several proxies of reputation and bargaining power and employ univariate as well as multivariate empirical tests.
a. Descriptive statistics
The relations between the investors and the venture capitalists are basically determined by the mentioned contractual arrangements. These are both the included covenants and the Coping the assumptions of the bargaining power hypothesis that fund managers with high bargaining power are induced to increase their fixed compensation over the whole funds' 14 life, we base our analyses on the net present value of management fee paid over the whole funds' life. 26 The present value of the management fee paid over the funds' life is the real charge that the investor has to pay for the funds' management. Figure The distribution of the hurdle rates, as preferred returns given to the investor, is shown in figure 5 . Nearly 50% of the funds do not have any hurdle rate. The variation is much higher as that of the carried interest. In general, the venture capitalists' equity participation has the character of a call option that entitles the venture capitalists to a certain share of the increase in value of the underlying fund. The exercise price corresponds to the cost basis of the fund. The hurdle rate has to be taken into account. The funds' life equals the life of the option. 27 Based on a Binomial model, we calculated the option value under consideration of a changing participation on capital 26 For calculating the NPV of the management fee we made the following assumptions: Following Gompers/Lerner (1999), we discounted the annually management fee (as a particular percentage on committed capital) with a rate of 10%. If the base used to calculate the fee varies over fund life and if its level is becoming uncertain (e.g., the capital under management), we discounted the corresponding fee with an increased rate of 20%. Despite that the individual funds' life time is usually stated in the PPMs', we calculated the NPV of the management fee over a standardized time period of ten years. This concerns to the fact that usually a life time extension is possible. An exact time period, during which the investor has to pay the fee, is not predictable. An assumed life time of 10 years excludes incorrect changes of the calculated level of the NPV of the management fee as a result of different inexact statements that are made in advance. This calculation procedure is the same done by Gompers and Lerner. For more information see Gompers/Lerner (1999), Appendix D. 27 See examples in Sahlmann (1990), pp. 496. 28 We based these calculations on similar assumptions made by Sahlmann (1990) , pp.496 ff. Using the BlackScholes model, the options' value is a function of volatility, the current market value of the funds' assets, the risk free rate, the profit participation (in%), the time to maturity, the strike price, and the hurdle rate. We assumed that the current market value of the fund equals the total original capital of the fund (the funds' costs). We set the median time to maturity of the samples' funds (10 years) as the options lifetime. According to Sahlmann (1990) , we assumed a risk free rate of 10% and a volatility of 50%. The level of profit participation equals the individual funds' carried interest arrangements. The strike price is set to be 100%. The results without consideration of a hurdle rate are consistent with those of Sahlmann (1990) . Due to the fact that the hurdle rate is an annually preferred return which is paid on capital that is drawn down deal by deal, exact determinations of the real option values are not possible. 
b. Univariate comparisons
We made univariate comparisons for that kind of contractual components, which are varying among the sample funds. The carried interest is highly standardized and, therefore, not analysed for variation in dependence of the mentioned determinants. Due to the highly standardized carried interest, incentive schemes are actually characterized and their quality is determined by the amount of capital contribution and by the ratio of performance related to fixed compensation. Furthermore contractual gaps should be closed by the implementation of covenants.
Testing the reputation hypothesis we used the differentiation debut fund manager or nondebut fund manager as the proxy for the venture capitalists' reputation. Only high performance fund managers who developed reputation by high-performing first funds are able to raise a follow on fund. First time fund managers without track record have no reputational capital. 29 Sometimes, the VC-firms' age or time in business is used as a proxy for its reputation. In the literature this measure is developed on the assumption that VC-firms, which are able to stay a long time in business, are high quality and well positioned. Low-quality venture capitalists should be unable to raise new funds and, therefore, to stay in business over a longer period of time. 30 As control variables we integrated also venture capitalists' age and the fund size. Nevertheless, we assume that the differentiation between first time fund managers and managers who have raised at least one fund before is a stronger proxy for reputation. The age of a venture capital firm and their actual fund size can be influenced by lots of other factors regardless of their reputation, e.g. an initial capital commitment by a captive sponsor to help the funds' market positioning even if it is the first fund of an unknown fund manager. 31 Testing the bargaining power hypothesis we used the relative growth of the venture capital pool as the proxy for the supply/demand situation and, therefore, the managers' bargaining power. The bargaining power of the venture capitalists is rising, when the demand for VC-services is increasing relative to a fixed number of VC-firms. We assume a low elasticity of new venture services (fixed number of VC-services within a short time horizon)
to increasing inflows. Therefore, bargaining power can be measured by the ratio of capital inflow and the existing venture pool. This corresponds exactly to the proxy that is used by Gompers and Lerner (1996) . 29 See Gompers / Lerner (1996), pp. 466 and Gompers/Lerner (1999), pp. 7 ff. and 17; besides the fact, that the venture capital firm raised at least one fund , which was managed as professional that the investors will entrust this venture capitalists with capital again, the cumulative experience of all the involved individual managing directors can be taken as a proxy of the degree of experience and reputation of the venture capital firm. Often reputation of a managing team is strongly dependent on the reputation of its members. Unfortunately, statements about the history and experience of the individual managers associated with the fund are very heterogeneous. Whereas in some PPMs complete CV's of the managing directors are given, often the statements about the individual backgrounds are incomplete or missing. Furthermore, it is unclear how to compare the different former activities to build a appropriate measure of experience. A practical measure often used to represent the managers experience is their active time in a business, which relates to the business of venture capital financing. Even if this measure could be designed, only some PPMs provide detailed biographical information. The dataset would be reduced to a small number. To address this concern this measure of reputation should not be used as an separate independent variable, but may underline the quality of the variable "Non-Debut Fund" as a proxy for the managing venture capitalists' reputation. To assess reputation and experience we examined the cumulative time in business of the associated managing directors. 11 PPMs provide complete biographical information. The analysis shows the tendency that "Non-Debut Funds" are managed by venture capital teams, whose cumulative time in business exceeds the time, which was spend by "Debut Fund" manager teams in VC-business. The Pearson correlation coefficient of 0,69 is significant at the 5% level (p-value: 0,017 / 2-tailed). 30 36 The venture capitalist, therefore, is confronted with a closer monitoring and has to compensate these weaknesses by consulting the entrepreneur. 37 Gompers (1995) has empirically assessed that the monitoring activity rises in situations with increasing asymmetric information distribution. 38 The associated higher costs of running and administrating the fund may be beard by the investors' management fee payments. 39 Within the context of agency problems between the limited partners and the venture capitalists Gompers and Lerner (1996) The univariate comparisons of the number of restrictions and regulations are summarized in table 8. The results show some significant differences in the mean number of covenants, if the dataset is divided by two measures suggested by the reputation hypothesis. "Non-debut funds" have a significantly higher restrictiveness. These differences are significant at the 1% level. Large funds also include more covenants. This is significant on a 5% level. These results reject the assumptions made by the reputation hypothesis. Furthermore, we can find dependencies from the date of contracting and according to the funds' legal origin. 
Number of Covenants
c. Multivariate analyses
We examined the determinants of the NPV of the management fee, the performance sensitivity, and the number of covenants (out of a total of 14) by applying a regression analysis with the econometric specification of ordinary least square. We analysed, however, the determinants of the hurdle rates by employing both the econometric specification of ordinary least square and the LOGIT-Model. For the OLS regression analysis we used the level of the received hurdle rate (preferred return on committed capital p.a.) as the dependent variable. Furthermore, we examined the determinants of a managing directors' obligation for a capital contribution by applying the Logit Model. The Logit-Models are employed determining the probability of the existence of any hurdle rate or any obligated capital contribution. Since the variation of the level of capital contribution is not normally distributed the econometric specification of OLS regression cannot be used. To avoid disturbing effects of multicollinearity we did the regression analyses more than once dropping some explanatory variables with linear relationship. Since in any case the results do not change significantly we can not observe strong effects of multicollinearity. Results are presented in table 9, 10 and 11, page 36. We weighted all other covenants, which prescribe a certain level of restrictiveness like the restriction on the use of debt with ω = [100% -percentage of committed capital that can be used for the particular action]. Except these covenants that give subjectively limited restriction (ω =0,5), all other covenants are weighted with ω =1, if they are included. The results of both regression analyses mainly correspond to each other. obligation for a capital contribution and the hurdle rate as dependent variables.
i. Effects of reputation on contractual design
We test whether the independent variable, non-debut manager that proxy for high reputation of the funds' manager differs from zero. Table 9 value of reputation as an additional security for the investor. 43 In the VC-market, this changing incentive situation has effects on contractual restrictiveness. Our argumentation is similar to that given by the learning model of Gompers and Lerner. As a result however, they assume changing incentive compensation. In Europe, we give empirical evidence that different inherent incentive situations do not affect compensation schemes, but the contractual restrictiveness.
For European partnership agreements the empirical results show only little evidence that reputation affects compensation terms. There is no significant effect on the fixed fees over funds' life, on the performance sensitivity of the compensation, and the hurdle rate ( ii.
Effects of bargaining power on contractual design
As tables 9 and 10 show, the variable that measures the growth rate of the venture pool has a significant effects on compensation, but not on the number of restrictive covenants. In years with a strongly growing VC-pool the demanded fixed fees decline. The bargaining power hypothesis is rejected on a 1% significance level. 44 According to highly standardized carried interest payments, the performance sensitivity is likely to increase in times the managers have high bargaining power. The results that are presented in panel 2 of table 10 are not consistent with the theoretical assumptions, either. Concerning the performance sensitivity the bargaining power hypothesis is rejected on a 10% and 5% significance level. Table 11 shows the effects of high bargaining power on the contracted hurdle rates and the capital contribution obligations. The bargaining power proxy significantly lowers the hurdle rate. This is confirmed by the OLS regression on a 10% level of significance and by the Logit 44 The results of the regression analysis are even confirmed, if the NPV of the management fee is calculated in the following way: The annually management fee payments (as the percentage on committed capital) are discounted only over this period of time, which is fixed in the partnership agreement (or in the PPM, if the PA is not available). If a life time extension is allowed, the management fees of the corresponding years are discounted with the increased rate of 20%. The OLS regression leads to the same signs of the coefficients and the null hypotheses of no difference are rejected for the same variables.
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Model on a 5% significance level. The obligation to make a capital contribution is not affected by the supply/demand situation.
Most of these results, except those concerning the hurdle rate, reject the bargaining power hypothesis. However, the effects of increasing bargaining power on compensation terms are jointly consistent and can be interpreted: As a result of lower fixed charges, the importance of performance related earnings as a part of the overall management compensation is rising. This is indicated by an increasing sensitivity of compensation to the performance. Our empirical results show that in times with a large VC-pool growth decreasing hurdle rates increase the value of the venture capitalists' carry option and intensify the importance of variable compensation. To test robustness of these results, we exchange the level of carried interest by the carried interest options' v alue measuring the individual sensitivity of compensation. Table 10 panel 3 presents the results that confirm our former findings: in times with a growing VC-pool, sensitivity of compensation to performance is increasing (10% or 5% level of significance). We recognize that venture capitalists with high bargaining power do not try to fix a higher amount of compensation for future times, but trust in performance related earnings. They believe in their future performance. This effect can be interpreted as a kind of overconfidence in times of growing markets. 45 Hvide (2000) summarizes several studies from psychology and experimental economics indicating that agents are overconfident about their own abilities. This can hardly be explained by any rational formation. 46 The findings of Camerer and Lovallo (1999) determine that overconfidence leads to excessive business entry. While analysing the impact of CEOs' overconfidence on mergers and acquisitions, Malmendier and Tate (2002) suggested that overconfident CEOs over-estimate their ability to generate returns. They found that overconfidence has the largest effect in firms with most cash. 47 Kyle and Wang (1997) predict that an overconfident trader trades more aggressively than his rational opponent. 48 This even 45 We see overconfidence also in the variation of the total compensation (NPV of management fee + option value carry). In times with a growing vc-pool it is also significantly decreasing. Only higher capital gains could compensate this decrease. See Table 10 ; as a result, they assume that the overconfident trader makes a higher expected profit and utility as his rational opponent. Referring to the changing venture capitalists attitude towards the way of fund managing and the changing preferred form of compensation, Sahlmann (1990) , pp 496 ff. suggests the inherent agency problem of higher valued carry options: "if one party has a contingent claim on value, there is an implicit incentive to increase risk". Analysing 2600 investments done between the years 1972 and 2002 of 60 funds of 32 venture capital companies [CEPRES Center of Private Equity Research] we found empirical evidence. If we assume identically independently distributed investments, the results of univariate comparisons indicate a significantly higher mean return but also higher volatility of investments that were done in times with high capital commitments. The mean IRR of investments that were 28 seems to affect the compensation schemes. Literature about the effects of overconfidence predicts that overconfident managers will prefer performance based incentive schemes more often than standard theory predicts. 49 Allen and Lueck (1995) found some evidence that this effect of overconfidence on the incentive design of contracts may be right. 50 All these general findings correspond to the results of our study. In times with a growing VC-pool, this means increasing cash inflows but a relatively constant number of fund managers, we can see indications of the discussed management-overconfidence. The fund managers lower the investment hurdles by lowering fixed charges and, therefore, ease business entry. Driven by the actually good market situation they are confident to compensate the lower fixed charges by performance related earnings. They expect higher future performance for themselves. As a result, they prefer to be paid by more sensitive compensation. We recognize a change to the riskier variable form of management compensation. This suits the generally more aggressive trading attitude of overconfident fund managers.
iii.
Other factors
The results of table 9, 10, and 11 indicate, that there is no significant time trend 29 participants converge to an optimal contractual design. 51 Initially, the transaction costs of writing sophisticated contracts including sufficient covenants are higher. This leads to a larger incompleteness of contracts with a lower number of included covenants. In Europe, we found empirical evidence.
Finally, as we assumed before early stage and high tech focused funds charge higher fixed fees to compensate higher administrative costs (table 10, panel 1). The coefficients of the corresponding control variables are significantly different from zero (at least 5% level of significance). However, there is no definite significant proof whether those funds have lower incentive compensation. Though highly standardized carried interest payments and higher fixed management fees, high tech funds do not have significantly lower performance sensitivity in compensation (table 10, panel 2 and 3). Furthermore, we found no effects on other compensation terms and on contractual restrictiveness (table 9 and 11).
Comparison of US and European empirical findings
Our results indicate strong differences in the way how reputation and bargaining power determine the design of US and European partnership agreements.
We find empirical evidence that there are different determinants of contractual restrictiveness in the US and in Europe. In the US, the number of included covenants is significantly influenced by the supply/demand situation for VC-services. Fund manager use their bargaining power in growth years to reduce contractual restrictiveness. In Europe, we found no evidence that growing bargaining power affects the completeness of contracts. We showed that reputation is the determinant which affects the use of covenants. The existence of different inherent incentives that are given to managers with or without reputation is adjusted by different contractual regulations.
Compensation terms are also influenced by different determinants. In the US, the fund managers' reputation affects both the NPV of management fees and the performance sensitivity of compensation. Young debut funds receive a larger fixed compensation and less performance related compensated. This may be explained by the fact that unknown young fund managers' work harder anyway in order to gain reputation. 
Summary and outlook
The similar development of the US-American and the European VC markets of the early 80ties and the mid 90ties, respectively, provides an attractive basis for analysing European market standards and comparing them to preceding US trends. In this paper, we empirically analyse the contractual relations between European venture capital funds and investors. We explore those contractual arrangements that are used to regulate the principal agent relationship between investors and fund-management. Contractual key elements are certain covenants, which restrict the venture capitalists from opportunistic behaviour, and compensation terms. In respect to compensation, our analysis refers to the management fee, the carried interest and its call option value, the hurdle rate, and the fund managers' obligation to make their own capital contribution.
To expose market reactions in the VC-market, we examine the economical effect of two determinants on contractual design: the agents' reputation and bargaining power. We develop empirical evidence that the effect of these determinants on the design of contracts does not completely correspond to general theoretical approaches. In the VC-business, markets seem to work different.
Regarding the question how VC-markets are working, we found empirical evidence. Our findings indicate a substantial impact of the managers' reputation and bargaining power on contractual design. Contrary to theoretical reasoning, reputation seems to aggravate the 31 incentive conflict between investors and managers instead of aligning their interests. This increases the need for higher contractual restrictiveness. Furthermore, we found signs of overconfidence. Managers in times with a growing VC-pool seem to prefer higher performance-related compensation and lower fixed payments. They renounce from using their negotiation power to increase guaranteed payments over the whole funds' life. They rely more on own future performance. This does not correspond to the price adjustments we expect from rational players.
We also unveil remarkable differences between the European and the US venture capital market to those of earlier US studies conducted by Gompers and Lerner (1996) and (1999).
They analysed US VC partnership agreements between 1979 and 1992. In comparison to the US, the European market seems to be different. Changing inherent incentives for fund managers with or without reputation are adjusted in the US by changing monetary incentives and in Europe by changing contractual restrictiveness. In Europe, the supply/demand situation for VC-services influences the management compensation but not the number of covenants.
In the US, the contractual restrictiveness is weaker when supply of venture capital increases.
When interpreting these different findings, we have to take under consideration that the European sample refers to partnership agreements which are drafted between 1996 and the end of 2001. We have no indication for the last years whether market forces on contractual arrangements also changed in the US. On the other hand, while approaching a global market standard we will maybe observe a changing European situation if we imply a mature and more professionalized US market. In the next years we can give empirical evidence.
Directions for future research are given by the analysis of dependencies between the contractual arrangements and the real net monetary performance of the VC investment and its volatility. In Fn.48 we made an initial investigation based on empirical data. However, to refer such an analysis to the results of this study it requires a corresponding dataset, which delivers performance information about the same 122 partnerships. These data are only The number of included covenants (out of 14) as a measure of contractual restrictiveness. The first column presents the independent variables. "Early stage", "Non-high-tech", "Non-debut fund" and "Anglo-Saxon origin of funds' management" are dummy variables with the base variables "Late/Balanced stage", "High-tech", "Debut fund", "Non-Anglo-Saxon origin", respectively. In the second to the eight' columns the coefficients of the OLS regression analyses are presented. In italics below the β estimates the p-value of the absolute heteroscedastic-consistent t-statistics is presented. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The last three rows present the r-square, the adjusted r-square, and the p-value of the F-test, that the set of coefficients is equal to zero.
Testing the robustness of results we included also dummy variables for all other European countries. We find no significant coefficient for other country dummies. The coefficients of the other factors do not change.
All OLS regressions satisfy the assumptions of the classical linear regression model. The chi-square goodness of fit test confirms the normality of the disturbance terms. The null hypotheses that the disturbances came from the normality probability distribution can not be rejected (chi-square=0; p-value=1).
It is conceivable that some econometric variables affect the contractual design and are, in turn, affected by it. It is likely that investors' decision concerning their investment amount is influenced by the quality of contractual design. We tested for simultaneity between compensations and fund sizes by applying the Hausman Specification Test. The hypothesis of simultaneity between # of covenants and fund size is rejected (t-value of i εˆ=0,492). [Gujarati, 1995, pp.670 ff.] The first row presents the dependent variables: obligated capital contribution by the venture capitalist and hurdle rate. The first, the third, and the fourth column present the results of the Logit-Analyses with funds obligating a capital contribution or conceding a hurdle rate coded as 1 (reference group) and those not obligating a contribution or not conceding a hurdle rate coded as 0. In the brackets next to the β estimates the odd-ratios are presented. In Italics the level of significances according to the Wald-test-statistics is given. The last four rows present the r-square, the adjusted r-square, the p-value of the F-test, that the set of coefficients is equal to zero, and the chi-square statistic (model fitting). For more details see notes of table 3.
Testing the robustness of results we included also dummy variables for all other European countries. Results do not change. We find no significant coefficient for other country dummies.
The hypothesis of simultaneity between Hurdle rate and fund size is rejected (t-value of i εˆ=0,651). Distributing capital gains would lower the compensation, which is paid to the venture capitalist. Therefore, the incentives of managing partners to reinvest capital gains are high, but not always optimal for the investors' purpose. The investor would have more chances to maximize his utility, if he could make the decision of reinvestment by himself. He would be even free to invest in a better performing fund. 55 The following covenants correspond to covenant class two and restrict the activities of the managing directors:
The fifth covenant settles the possibility of co-investing by managing partners in portfolio companies. Direct investment in a portfolio company is restricted or limited. Co-investment in certain portfolio companies would dilute the incentive that is given by the carried interest to optimise the entire portfolio. The carried interest can be seen as an indirect participation on the whole portfolio. Single selected investments in certain portfolio companies would intensify the managing partners' effort to increase the return of these companies. A portfolio optimisation is not guaranteed. 
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Covenant number six restricts or limits the managing partners' ability of investing in non portfolio companies, which are acting in the same or similar business fields that correspond to the funds investment area. The managing partners are restricted to do own investments in high quality companies, instead investing funds' capital. Their monetary return should exclusively be generated by participating the portfolio return. This increases the incentive to take all potentially highly rewarded emerging companies, the managing partners have the opportunity to invest in, into the portfolio.
Capital contribution of the managing directors was one of the mentioned solutions of agency problems. Restrictions on selling the managing partners' partnership shares or interests maintain the incentives that are given by a capital contribution for the funds' whole life.
Covenant number seven limits the sale of partnership shares. Contractual regulations differ.
Sometimes, partnership agreements restrict the managing partners completely to participate the venture fund. Some other agreements prescribe a participating share of a determined amount, but do not restrict a later sale of those shares. Long lasting real incentives are given, if the participation is prescribed and the sale of partnership shares is restricted.
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Covenant number eight restricts new fund raising by the managing partners over the managing period. They should engage completely in managing one fund. A new fund raising would reduce the venture capitalists' attention on managing the former fund. The overall management fees paid by the limited partners of both funds, however, would increase.
Usually the managing partners are restricted to raise new funds until a certain amount, mostly 75 per cent, of committed capital is invested. 58 The next covenant restricts outside actions done by the managing partners. Other actions than managing the venture fund are likely to reduce the effort given to the portfolio-management.
Especially within the commitment period, where the due diligence of potential portfolio companies takes much time, all attention should be spend for managing the fund. According to that need this kind of covenant refers often only to a period of time until a certain amount 57 Gompers/Lerner (1996), pp. 482 ; Section 6.3 analyses the sample partnerships about the interaction of covenant number seven and the capital contribution that has to be donated by the investment managers. 58 Gompers / Lerner (1996), pp. 482 42 of committed capital is invested. The analysis of the partnership agreements shows, that in most cases only other investment activities or consulting activities are restricted. That is a weak form of this covenant, but, however, it restricts opportunistic behaviour of the managing partners. It prevents conflicts, which arise by investing capital from different sources and consulting different venture funds.
Covenant number ten restricts the addition of new managing partners. An extremely important factor within the due diligence process is the assessment of managing partners' former performance. The quality of the management is a soft factor, which cannot be measured on a quantitative basis. 59 The later addition of new managing partners would take the investors possibility of judging the involved managing partners in advance. Less talented and competent managing partners could join the limited partnership and would dilute the overall managing performance. The originally involved venture capitalists may reduce their efforts for the funds' management and may increase private benefits by concentrating on other actions.
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The last four covenants correspond to the covenant class three and restrict the type of investment.
As mentioned above, the assessment of the managing partners' competence and their extensive reputation in that kind of business are often decisive to make an actual investment.
The eleventh covenant restricts the managing partners' ability to invest funds' capital in other venture funds. By doing so they would give investment decisions out of their hands. The managing partners would earn the same high compensation and would have less expenditure.
These kinds of restrictions are particularly important for fund of fund investment companies to carry out wise investment decisions. To achieve the aspired return-risk profile, they have to relay on the pronounced investment procedure of the funds. Therefore, covenants, which adjust this on a contractual basis, are important for their portfolio management. Finally, we analysed a covenant that restricts the investment in companies which are actually controlled by the managing partners. Moreover, it restricts investment, if the managing partners are already invested in that company for their own account. The venture capitalists could increase their private benefit by investing funds' capital in companies where they hold a monetary participation. This could lead to opportunistic behaviour of the managing partners, because an investment in those companies will not always be the optimal choice. 62 Gompers/Lerner (1996), pp. 483 f.
